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Multiproduct Discounting:
A Myth of Nonprice Predation
Daniel A. Cranet
As Herbert Hovenkamp writes in this Symposium, antitrusters
continue their search for the verbal formulation capturing the essence
of a unilateral exclusionary practice.' Consensus on a single form of
words encapsulating the full range of offending practices remains elu-
sive. In recent memory, the Supreme Court has contented itself (on
the relatively infrequent occasions it has shown any interest in the
matter) with defining classes of forbidden conduct, without enunciat-
ing a grand unifying theory. So predatory pricing,' patent fraud,3 exclu-
sive dealing,' and certain refusals to deal' are well-known classes of
unlawful behavior with distinct legal elements, but one could not per-
fectly predict from the rules governing such practices all of the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for a different practice to qualify as
exclusionary.
" Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
J.D., The University of Chicago; B.A., Wheaton College. This Essay has benefited from discus-
sions with Thomas Lambert and Chris Sprigman. All opinions and errors are my own.
1 Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U Chi L Rev 147, 148 (2005)
("No generalized formulation of unilateral ... exclusionary conduct enjoys anything approaching
universal acceptance."). For another thoughtful exploration of the definitional issue, see Einer
Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan L Rev 253, 343 (2003) (positing that
the proper standard for exclusionary conduct would allow conduct that improves a monopolist's
efficiency, while disallowing conduct that impairs rivals' efficiency).
2 See Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209,222-24 (1993)
(holding that predatory pricing is illegal only if the defendant's price is below an appropriate
measure of cost and the defendant can recoup the costs of predation through supracompetitive
pricing).
3 See Walker Process Equipment, Inc v Food Machinery & Chemical Corp, 382 US 172,
176-77 (1965) (holding that the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud constitutes a viola-
tion of § 2 of the Sherman Act, provided that all other elements of violation are proven).
4 See Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services Inc, 504 US 451, 483-85 (1992)
(holding that exclusive dealing, absent a legitimate, nonpretextual, business reason, is anticom-
petitive behavior in violation of the Sherman Act).
5 See Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 US 585,600-01 (1985) (hold-
ing that, although a firm with monopoly power has no generalized duty to enter cooperative
ventures with its competitors, the monopolist's decision not to enter such ventures has eviden-
tiary value and may, in some circumstances, give rise to liability under the Sherman Act); Lorain
Journal Co v United States, 342 US 143, 155 (1951) (holding that a monopolist's general right to
choose its business partners is not absolute, and that the exercise of that right can run afoul of
the Sherman Act when its impetus is to exclude competitors from the marketplace).
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The Third Circuit's en banc decision in LePage's Inc v 3M (Min-
nesota Mining and Manufacturing Co) discovers a new form of exclu-
sionary conduct: bundling through above-cost, multiproduct discount-
ing. In a nutshell, the Third Circuit found 3M liable under § 2 of the
Sherman Act7 for offering its retailer-customers financial incentives to
purchase specified quantities of products in its product portfolio, to
the detriment of LePage's, which offered only a single product (pri-
vate-label transparent tape) competitive with 3M's product line. Since
there was no evidence that 3M priced its products "below cost," even
if all discounts in the package were reallocated to transparent tape,8
the Third Circuit could not condemn 3M's rebate program as an in-
stance of predatory pricing.9 No matter. LePage's was not alleging
predatory pricing but rather bundling through package discounting;
thus, according to the Third Circuit, the standards for predatory pric-
ing did not apply.' It was sufficient that 3M's discounts were "exclu-
sionary" of rivals."
The potential impact of the Third Circuit's decision on industrial
pricing practices and price competition is substantial. Package dis-
counting (or "mixed bundling") is a pervasive phenomenon in the
national economy, and one that produces substantial consumer bene-
6 324 F3d 141 (3d Cir 2003) (en banc), cert denied, 124 S Ct 2932 (2004). The Supreme
Court denied certiorari after the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission opined
that "it would be preferable to allow the case law and economic analysis to develop further and
to await a case with a record better adapted to development of an appropriate standard" before
deciding whether above-cost, multiproduct discounts are immune from antitrust condemnation.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 3M Co v LePage's Inc, No 02-1865, *19 (S Ct filed
May 28,2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 1205191) ("U.S. LePage's Amicus").
7 15 USC § 2 (2000).
8 Unless otherwise noted, throughout this Essay when I speak about cost/revenue com-
parisons for a particular product I assume that all discounts on other products in the package are
subtracted from the revenues for the competitive product. Thus, if Firm X offers a 10 percent
discount on Products A-C if customers will buy all three products from Firm X, Firm X's price
for Product A would be "below cost" in the way in which I use those words if Firm X's revenues
for Product A minus the 10 percent discounts that customers would forgo by buying Products
A-C outside the package are less than Firm X's marginal cost of producing Product A. From the
perspective of the firm offering the package, this discount reallocation method is the most dra-
conian way of comparing costs and revenues for antitrust purposes; more lenient cost/revenue
comparisons may well be justified in many circumstances.
9 The Supreme Court requires a showing of pricing below "an appropriate measure" of
cost in cases of avowed predatory pricing. Brooke Group, 509 US at 222.
10 LePage's, 324 F3d at 154-55 (explaining that bundled rebate programs are more akin to
tying than to predatory pricing).
11 Id at 154 (alluding to "the full panoply of 3M's exclusionary conduct"). The court refers
to 3M's conduct as "exclusionary" fifty-two times, without ever giving a precise definition of that
word's legal meaning. The closest we get is an explanation that there are forms of exclusionary
conduct other than predatory pricing, id at 152-54, which is accurate, but no more helpful than
defining murder by saying that homicides other than garroting can constitute the crime.
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fits.2 By divorcing the legality of multiproduct discounting from the
familiar, if inexact, cost/revenue comparisons of predatory pricing
theory, the LePage's opinion sets package discounts sailing on then-
Judge Taft's proverbial "sea of doubt" by requiring courts to pass on
the reasonableness of prices and discounts without any concrete
governing norms." Since even above-cost package discounts are illegal
if "exclusionary" of rivals-and we are left with no guidance as to
what "exclusionary" means-any multiproduct discount threatening
the viability of a competitor could be deemed unlawful, whatever the
efficiency of the competitor or the economic sensibility of the dis-
count.
The Third Circuit's separation of multiproduct discounting from
predatory pricing lacks any rigorous economic basis. Surely, the justifi-
cation for discarding the Supreme Court's predatory pricing safe har-
bor-where revenues exceed costs"-cannot be that the plaintiff de-
cided to label its suit something other than "predatory pricing." If
above-cost package discounts are condemned while equivalent single
product discounts are privileged, it must be that above-cost package
discounts have a greater tendency to cause social harm than their sin-
gle product counterparts. I will argue in this Essay that reality is just
the opposite-that a multiproduct discount is generally less likely to
have an exclusionary effect than would an equivalent discount on a
single product because the presence of competitors for other products
in the package will generally mean that the "victim" firm must absorb
less than the entire package discount to remain price competitive. Fur-
ther, a single product firm that absorbs the entire package discount
but can still make sales above cost is no worse off than if the multi-
product firm used an equivalent, and entirely legal, single product
discount on the competitive product. Thus, above-cost package
discounts-like above-cost price cuts of any kind-should be per se
lawful.
12 See text accompanying notes 38-46.
13 See United States v Addyston Pipe and Steel Co, 85 F 271, 283-84 (6th Cir 1898) (Taft)
(asserting that courts "set sail on a sea of doubt" when they "assume[] the power to say, in re-
spect to contracts which have no other purpose and no other consideration on either side than
the mutual restraint of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public interest and
how much is not"), affd, 175 US 211 (1899).
14 See Brooke Group, 509 US at 223 (explaining that low yet still above-cost prices benefit
consumers, and that the antitrust laws should not be construed to protect competitors from
above-cost prices, since they would then render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices in
order to increase market share).
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To unravel these "novel and difficult" questions," this Essay con-
siders package discounts from three perspectives: Part I discusses the
perspective of the ostensible "victim" of package discounts-the sin-
gle product competitor; Part II addresses the view of the alleged
"predator"-the diversified firm that offers the package discount; and
Part III considers the customer who supposedly is coerced into buying
products or services within the package offered by the "predator."
I. THE "VICTIM" PERSPECTIVE
Whatever the platonic definition of "exclusionary conduct," the
general concern is over conduct that is without social welfare justifica-
tions and is capable of driving out competitors that society would pre-
fer to remain in the market." Pricing below marginal cost on a single
product theoretically meets these criteria." First, under most circum-
stances such pricing is irrational absent the prospect of a competitor's
exit and recoupment; therefore, its necessary path is toward supra-
competitive, and hence socially undesirable, prices." Second, pricing
15 U.S. LePage's Amicus at *8 (cited in note 6). One might take issue with at least the gov-
ernment's "novelty" characterization. LePage's is not the first case, even within the Third Circuit,
to address the legality of package discounts, see SmithKline Corp v Eli Lilly and Co, 575 F2d
1056 (3d Cir 1978) (holding that a discount that effectively required the purchase of a package of
competitive and noncompetitive products in order to advance a monopolist's influence and
crowd out competitors was an exclusionary practice triggering liability under the Sherman Act),
and the issue has been fully discussed in other circuits as well. See, for example, Ortho Diagnostic
Systems, Inc v Abbott Laboratories, Inc, 920 F Supp 455 (SD NY 1996) (holding that the fact that
a monopolist priced all products in a tie-in offer at or above its cost, before discounts were real-
located from monopoly market to competitive market, did not automatically derail a competi-
tor's claims of anticompetitive behavior under the Sherman Act).
16 This formulation leaves for another day the question of whether only "equally efficient"
competitors are worthy of remaining in the market or whether those who are not yet as efficient,
but may be someday if they are not first excluded by the putative monopolist, are also worthy of
some consideration. See Hovenkamp, 72 U Chi L Rev at 153-54 (cited in note 1) (discussing the
use of the "equally efficient rival" test in predatory pricing cases, which states that a firm should
not be penalized for having lower costs than its rivals and setting its price accordingly).
17 See Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv L Rev 697, 732-33 (1975) (concluding that when a com-
pany sells its products below marginal or average variable costs, that action should be deemed
predatory by the courts and should trigger liability under the Sherman Act). John Lott has of-
fered a persuasive case that the relevant game-theoretic models used to make this claim of pre-
dation lack real-world examples. See John R. Lott, Jr., Are Predatory Commitments Credible?:
Who Should the Courts Believe? 1-3 (Chicago 1999) (stating that few empirical studies have
been undertaken to test assumptions about whether predation is in practice profitable).
18 Areeda and Turner, 88 Harv L Rev at 698 (cited in note 17) (arguing that predatory
pricing would be irrational unless the potential predator had greater financial staying power than
rivals and a substantial prospect of recoupment).
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below marginal cost is capable of driving out a less-capitalized firm by
forcing losses that the "victim" cannot afford.'9
Should package discounting be considered akin to below-cost
pricing? Let us put aside for the moment the social welfare or effi-
ciency prong and focus simply on the second criterion-the victim
firm's ability to mount an effective response. Does the practice of giv-
ing customers discounts or rebates to purchase across the supplier's
product line threaten single product firms with exclusion? That de-
pends on the structure of both the market and the discount program,
as well as the volume of the discounts.
The critical question from the victim firm's perspective is whether
it can match the multiproduct firm's discounts without pricing below
its cost. Since customers who purchase from the single product firm
will forgo the package discounts available from the multiproduct firm,
the single product firm must price the single product so as to make
customers indifferent on price whether they purchase within the
package or A la carte. In some cases, this may mean that the single
product firm would have to offer such a large discount in order to re-
main price competitive that its costs would exceed its revenues.
Whether or not the victim firm would be forced to price below cost
depends on many case-specific factors.
The victim firm's ability to match the multiproduct firm's effec-
tive price depends in part on how much competition the predator firm
faces with respect to other products included in the discount package.
If the firm offering the package discount faces effective competition
as to each product in its portfolio, under most circumstances package
discounting cannot put any single firm competitor at any great disad-
vantage. Suppose, for example, that Multi-Firm makes five products-
A, B, C, D, and E-and typically sells each for $10, with a marginal
cost of production of $6 per unit. Multi-Firm decides to offer custom-
ers a new package discount-10 percent off of each product in its
portfolio, but only if the customer purchases one unit of each product.
Suppose further that Multi-Firm has five competitors, each of which
produces only one of the five products and has the same price and
cost structure as Multi-Firm. None of the five competitor firms can
match Multi-Firm's entire package discount individually and remain
profitable. The discount a customer receives for buying within Multi-
Firm's package program is $5, and if any single competitor offered a
$5 discount on its single product, it would be pricing at $1 below its
marginal cost. But if each of the five competitor firms lowers its price
19 Id at 698-99 (noting that predatory pricing will succeed only where the predator firm
has significantly more resources than the competing firm and the barriers to entry are high).
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by $1 on its own product, each can profitably sell the goods at the
same effective price as Multi-Firm's package discount price."
In a market with reasonably good, low-cost information, and
firms with reasonably equivalent strength, one would expect implicit
coordination of price cuts by the five competitive firms, leading to
across-the-board price cuts and something close to egalitarian absorp-
tion of the package discount by each of the five competitive firms. If
many customers purchase all five products and Firms A through E
keep their prices constant at amounts equivalent to Multi-Firm's pre-
discount level, they may lose substantial market share to Multi-Firm
and possibly be driven out of business. But if each firm lowers its price
by something close to 10 percent, it will make customers indifferent,
from a pricing perspective, whether they buy within the package or
outside.
It is highly unlikely that a diversified firm could simultaneously
monopolize five separate markets through a package discount by
starving the competitor in each market of revenues while neither the
victim firm nor the victim firm's counterparts in other markets re-
sponded with single product discounts sufficient to neutralize the ef-
fects of the package discount. But one can script a scenario where a
single firm is forced to bear a disproportionate percentage of the
price-cutting burden, perhaps to the point of unprofitability. It is pos-
sible, for example, that buyers who tend to buy all five products tend
to buy more of Product A than Products B through E and therefore,
package discounting leads to a more significant decline in demand for
Product A as a stand-alone product than for the four other products in
the package. Firms B through E may therefore be able to ignore the
package discount and continue to focus on single product buyers,
whereas Firm A has no choice but to attempt to match the discounts
in Products B through E. Or, Firm A may have a higher minimum vi-
able scale than the other firms such that, whereas Firms B through E
choose not to lower price and compete for multiproduct purchasers,
Firm A must either do so or exit the market.
Even the presence of competition in the other markets included
in a multiproduct discount does not ensure that a firm that does not
produce or sell those other products has to match only the discount on
20 For purposes of simplicity, I assume that marginal cost or average variable cost (its
surrogate) is the appropriate measure of cost for predatory pricing determinations. See id at 702-
03. The Supreme Court has never formally decided what the appropriate measure of cost should
be, and the federal circuits remain split, although language in Brooke Group Ltd v Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209, 219-27 (1993), could be read as an implicit endorsement
of a marginal cost test. See Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, 3 Antitrust Law: An
Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application I 723d2 at 280-81 (Aspen 2d ed 2002).
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its own product in order to be competitive on price. It is possible that,
even though Multi-Firm faces competition from Firms A through E in
each of its five product categories, Firm A must match a discount
greater than 10 percent (the amount hypothesized for Multi-Firm's
package discount) and possibly even approaching 50 percent (the 10
percent discount on all five equally priced products) in order to re-
main price competitive in the single product that Firm A produces.
But what about in a world in which Multi-Firm has a monopoly in
Products B through E? Firm A is probably going to have to drop its
price even more than it would if there were competitors for Products
B through E. In order to make customers who want all five products
indifferent on price whether they buy the package from Multi-Firm or
buy Product A from Firm A and the other four items at Multi-Firm's
undiscounted price, Firm A must drop its price by $5 (in our hypo-
thetical). Since we suppose that Firm A has a marginal cost of $6, this
would effectively mean pricing below Firm A's marginal cost. From
the victim perspective, then, such pricing may appear predatory."
Pricing such as that described in the previous paragraph-where
the single product firm would have to price below its marginal cost in
order to make customers indifferent on price whether they purchased
within or without the package-could be described as anticompetitive.
Such pricing has the potential to exclude a competitor that is as effi-
cient as the multiproduct firm (assuming that diversification is not
itself a form of efficiency) and to permit the multiproduct firm to re-
coup the costs of offering the package discount through monopoly
pricing. Such package pricing could be described as "below cost" un-
der the theory that, as a matter of proper antitrust analysis, all of the
discounts should be reallocated to the market where the single prod-
uct firm competes. Particularly if the multiproduct firm has a monop-
oly in the other markets included in the package, one might say that
any discounts being given in the monopoly markets should really be
considered discounts in the competitive market, since the obvious
purpose of such discounts is to maximize sales in the competitive
market.2
21 1 use "predatory" in roughly the same sense as the "sacrifice" theory of exclusionary
conduct, see note 52 and accompanying text, where the single product "victim" would have rea-
son to believe that the multiproduct firm would not have undertaken the pricing strategy unless
it hoped to drive out the victim firm. Apologies to Richard Epstein, organizer of this Symposium,
who believes that "[tlhe language of predator and prey is best applied to lions stalking ante-
lopes." Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 110 (Harvard 1995).
22 Since firms have no incentive to discount in monopoly markets, one might say that the
monopoly market discount is just a disguised discount in the competitive market.
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The optimal legal treatment of such "below cost" package dis-
counting is a difficult question-one that I do not attempt to address
here." LePage's does not involve such a scenario, nor am I aware of
any other case that does. It is not unusual, however, that a package
discount forces the single product firm to lower its price-but only to
a level that is still above cost. Such "above cost" package discounting
raises different antitrust questions than "below cost" package dis-
counting.
To see why, let us change the numbers in the last hypothetical.
Suppose that Multi-Firm and Firm A both have a marginal cost of $6
for Product A, that prior to Multi-Firm's package discount the market
price for Products A, B, and C was $10 each, that Multi-Firm has a
monopoly over Products B and C, and that Multi-Firm announces a 10
percent discount for any customer who will purchase all three prod-
ucts from Multi-Firm. Assume for the sake of the model that custom-
ers generally buy all three products and want the three products in
roughly equivalent amounts.V In order to remain price competitive
with Multi-Firm, Firm A must lower its price to $7. Now customers
will pay $27 for one of each of Products A, B, and C whether they pur-
chase within Multi-Firm's package discount or outside. Since Firm A's
marginal cost is $6, it is still pricing above cost and will not be driven
23 Another difficult question, not presented by LePage's, is what to do if the diversified
firm's revenues from all products offered in the package exceed its marginal cost of producing
the package but, if all discounts were allocated to a single competitive product in the package,
the cost of producing that product would exceed its discount-adjusted revenues. For a thoughtful
treatment of this question, see Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 Minn L
Rev (forthcoming 2005). On the one hand, such a pricing strategy could potentially exclude
(even in the short run) single product competitors who were as efficient in the production of the
single product as the diversified firm. On the other hand, such discounting could be part of a
legitimate and nonpredatory business strategy to increase profits. Further, if the discount re-
flected economies of scope or scale in multiproduct distribution, if consumers preferred purchas-
ing in packages to purchasing A la carte, or if the package discount produced lower net prices
than otherwise would be offered, it would seem very unwise to prohibit the discount, even if it
led to the elimination of rivals.
24 Different assumptions would change the math, but not the principle. Regardless of the
amount of each item purchased, the "victim" perspective would require a computation of the
discount that the alleged victim would have to offer to make customers indifferent on price
whether they purchased within the package discount or outside of it. For example, suppose
Multi-Firm sold Product A for $10, Product B for $8, and Product C for $6, and offered an
across-the-board 10 percent discount to customers who purchased at least $100 of goods in each
of the categories. Suppose Customer X required fifteen units of Product A, twenty units of Prod-
uct B, and twenty-five units of Product C. If it purchased all of its requirements from Multi-Firm,
its price would be 0.9 [ $10(15) + $8(20) + $6(25)] = $414. If it purchased Product A from Firm A,
its price from Multi-Firm on Products B and C would be $8(20) + $6(25) = $310. In order to
make Customer X indifferent on price, Firm A must offer to sell fifteen units of Product A for
$414 - $310 = $104, effectively a per-unit price of $6.93. That is still above Firm A's marginal cost,
and the multiproduct discount therefore does not yield an exclusionary short-term effective
price from the "victim" perspective.
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from the market in the short run. (We take up the long-run implica-
tions later.)
Those, roughly, are the facts of LePage's, which instructs us that
such bundled pricing is not below cost (even after all discounts are
reallocated to the competitive market), but possibly still exclusionary.5
But, focusing still on the "victim" perspective, it is not at all clear why
such pricing would tend to be more exclusionary (from Firm A's per-
spective) than if Multi-Firm had simply dropped its price on the single
Product A to $7 without using a multiproduct discount to achieve the
$7 effective price. Under conventional antitrust principles, a single
product discount of $3 would be considered an "above cost" price cut
26
and therefore lawful. If we concede that it would be perfectly lawful,
indeed socially beneficial, for Multi-Firm to drop its price on Product
A to $7 through a unilateral price cut on Product A, why should it be
any less lawful for Multi-Firm to charge an effective price of $7 on
Product A by giving a 10 percent discount on Products A, B, and C?
Can the package discount be more exclusionary of Firm A than a sin-
gle product discount of the same amount?
It is possible to answer yes for two separate reasons. First, one
could view Multi-Firm's package discount as a means of price dis-
criminating in a way inaccessible to Firm A. 7 The price discrimination
25 LePage's, 324 F3d at 154-55 (explaining that evidence of an above-cost price after ac-
counting for discounts is not dispositive of monopolization claims); Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rani, 3M Co v LePage's Inc, No 02-1865, *5 (S Ct filed June 20, 2003) (available on Westlaw at
2003 WL 22428375) ("3M Cert Petition") (arguing that however reallocated, the discounts did
not cause 3M's prices for private-label tape to fall below cost). If anything, the facts of LePage's
were less favorable for the "victim's" claim of exclusion than those hypothesized here, since 3M
claims that it did not have monopolies in the other products in its package. 3M Cert Petition at
*19.
26 1 am proceeding on the conventional assumption that above-cost pricing on a single
product is per se legal, as the Supreme Court held in Brooke Group. 509 US at 222-23. The
conventional position, of course, has its detractors. See, for example, Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping
Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L J 941,945 (2002):
In markets where an incumbent monopoly enjoys significant advantages over potential en-
trants, but another firm enters and provides buyers with a substantial discount, the monop-
oly should be prevented from responding with substantial price cuts or significant product
enhancements until the entrant has had a reasonable time to recover its entry costs and be-
come viable, or until the entrant's share grows enough so that the monopoly loses its domi-
nance.
The detractors have their own detractors. See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to
Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory-and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market
Power, 112 Yale L J 681, 754-807 (2003) (arguing that efforts to restrict above-cost predatory
pricing are both harmful and futile).
27 LePage's did not assert a Robinson-Patman claim against 3M. See LePage's Inc v 3M
(Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co), 1999 US Dist Lexis 8036, *7 (ED Pa); Robinson-
Patman Anti-Discrimination Act, 15 USC §§ 13a, 13b, 21a (2000). The price discrimination the-
ory has been floated not as a theory of statutory liability, but rather to explain why package
discounting might be exclusionary of single product firms.
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story takes two different shapes, neither of which is persuasive. The
first version asserts that package discounts prevent the single product
firm from competing for the business of any customer who exhibits
very strong demand for certain products in the multiproduct firm's
package discount portfolio. For example, if Multi-Firm offers a 10 per-
cent discount on Products A through C to customers who buy all
three, Firm A, which produces only Product A, allegedly faces a tre-
mendous disadvantage in competing for the business of any customer
who highly values Products B or C or who needs Products B or C in
much greater quantities than Product A. But nothing in Multi-Firm's
package discount offer prevents the customer from buying Products B
and C from Multi-Firm and Product A from Firm A, provided that
Firm A is willing to make up whatever discount the customer has lost
on Products B and C by lowering the price of Product A. If Firm A
lowers its price on Product A to make up for whatever discount the
customer has forgone on Products B and C and Firm A's revenues still
exceed marginal cost, Firm A is still no worse off than if Multi-Firm
had simply dropped its price on Product A to the same above-cost
level. The strength of the customer's demand for the noncompetitive
products is irrelevant if Firm A can profitably match Multi-Firm's dis-
count, and the amount of Products B and C demanded goes only to
the computation of how much of a discount Firm A has to match. If
the math turns out such that Firm A can match the discount and re-
main above marginal cost-that is to say, if the discount is "above
cost" as that term is used in this Essay-then the single product firm
cannot be excluded in the short run.8 (Again, long-run implications
must wait.)
The second version of the price discrimination story goes as fol-
lows. If not every customer wants to buy all three products in Multi-
Firm's discount portfolio, Multi-Firm will continue to sell individual
units of Products A through C at its undiscounted price. But since
28 There is no indication in the publicly available record as to whether LePage's could have
matched all of 3M's discount and remained above cost. The record showed that if all of the dis-
count were reallocated to private-label tape, 3M would have remained above cost. See 3M Cert
Petition at *5 (cited in note 25). If LePage's was as efficient as 3M in the production of private-
label tape, it could have matched all of 3M's discount and remained above cost. LePage's expert
economist testified that LePage's was not as efficient as 3M in the production of private-label
transparent tape. LePage's, 324 F3d at 177 (Greenberg dissenting). If 3M's bundled rebates were
"exclusionary" because LePage's could not match them and still be pricing above its marginal
cost, then a 3M discount to the same price point but only applied to transparent tape would also
be "exclusionary," even though legal under Brooke Group. 509 US at 222-23. If Brooke Group's
categorical privileging of above-cost single product discounts is justified even when such dis-
counts exclude less efficient competitors, there is no reason to be less protective of package
discounts on the grounds that the single product firm may be less efficient in the production of
the competitive product.
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Firm A is offering only one product for sale-and hence only one
price-if it is unable to price discriminate, it must price either all or
none of Product A at $7. Such package discounting could be seen as a
form of "reducing rivals' revenues" 29 by forcing a single product com-
petitor to make all sales at the lowest common denominator price,
even while the "predator" continues to earn higher profits on certain
individual unit sales.
But that is also wrong, for two reasons. First, it assumes that Firm
A is stuck with offering a single price on Product A and is unable to
price discriminate. Those are not the facts of LePage's, where the
competing firms made their sales as part of individually negotiated
contracts with large, powerful retailers such as Wal-Mart, Kmart, Sta-
ples, OfficeMax, and Walgreens. '° Those are not the facts in the general
case either. Firms show significant resiliency in figuring out price dis-
crimination schemes when their survival is on the line.3' For example,
Firm A might offer a rebate to any customer who produced a receipt
showing the purchase of Products B and C from Multi-Firm,32 it might
ascertain the classes of customer most likely to need all three products
and devise a discounted pricing plan targeted to such customers," or it
might purchase Products B and C from Multi-Firm and sell its own
Product A together with Multi-Firm's Products B and C at a package-
discounted price.' While it is possible to devise a theoretical model in
which Firm A has no ability to price discriminate and therefore must
offer a single low price, it is far more likely in most cases that the sin-
gle product firm will find a way to offer a discount equal to the pack-
age discount in those cases where it must do so to meet the multipro-
duct firm's effective price.
Depending on the number of multiproduct and single product
customers in the market, Firm A may choose either to drop its price to
29 See David T. Levy and David Reiffen, Vertical Integration as Strategic Behavior in a
Spatial Setting: Reducing Rivals' Revenues (FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No 165,
1988) (analyzing how vertical integration may deter entry by restricting the potential entrant
from selling to its most desirable customers, thus reducing rivals' revenues).
30 See LePage's, 324 F3d at 171-73 (Greenberg dissenting). LePage's responded to 3M's
rebate program with targeted price discounts to large customers, which shows that LePage's was
not stuck with offering a uniform price scheme regardless of the effects of 3M's discounts.
31 See EM. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Perform-
ance 491-94 (Rand McNally 3d ed 1990) (cataloguing price discrimination mechanisms).
32 Id at 492.
33 Id.
34 This was the strategy attempted in Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472
US 585 (1985), where Aspen Highlands' attempt to form a similar package was rendered unsuc-
cessful by Aspen Skiing's refusal to sell its tickets to Aspen Highlands at retail price. The practice
found illegal was not Aspen Skiing's three-mountain package pricing but its refusal to sell tickets
to Aspen Highlands at retail price and other refusals to cooperate. Id at 608-09.
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meet the effective price of the multiproduct firm's package discount,
or keep its price the same and sell only to those who do not want all
three products. If the number of customers who would prefer to buy
only Product A is relatively large, then Firm A may opt to concentrate
on that segment of the market and not attempt to match Multi-Firm's
entire discount. If, on the other hand, the number of customers who
desire all three products is relatively large, then, unless Multi-Firm is
discounting to levels below cost, Firm A could simply apply the entire
discount offered by the package to its one product, rendering Multi-
Firm's advantage from package discounting relatively insignificant.
The price discrimination story fails to offer a persuasive reason
why the "victim" of a multiproduct discount scheme should care
whether the $7 effective price it must meet on Product A is the result
of a unilateral $3 price discount on Product A or three $1 discounts on
Products A, B, and C. But there is a second objection to above-cost
package discounting one might offer. Unlike single product predatory
pricing, which is inordinately expensive as a long-run strategy,3" multi-
product discounting employs cross-subsidization and is therefore a
sustainable form of long-run predation, or limit pricing, capable of
excluding single product firms and creating impenetrable long-run
barriers to entry-or so the theory goes. This objection no longer re-
counts a pure "victim" perspective because it has less to do with the
single product firm's ability to meet the package discount than with
the multiproduct firm's incentives and ability to sustain the discount
program. So now we must move from the "victim's" perspective to the
"predator's" perspective.
II. THE "PREDATOR" PERSPECTIVE
Why would a firm give a discount on its monopoly of Products B
and C as part of a package sale including Product A on which it faced
competition? One possible reason would be to drive out competitors
that cannot match the Product A discount, allowing the discounting
firm thereafter to recoup (and more than recoup) its price discounting
35 A long-run predatory pricing scheme would be foolish to attempt. "Predatory pricing is
an extraordinarily expensive and risky way to create market power," Herbert Hovenkamp, Ex-
clusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 Colum Bus L Rev 1, 81, and the longer the term
of the campaign, the riskier and more expensive the strategy. Even if the "predator" were ulti-
mately successful in driving out a competitor, the likelihood of recouping the present value of
prior years' forgone revenues before new entry eliminated the monopolist's ability to charge
supracompetitive prices would be highly attenuated. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v
Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 588-93 (1986) (describing the speculative nature of predatory
pricing schemes and emphasizing the need to determine whether the alleged predator would
have had a credible motive to engage in the scheme, as indicated by a strong likelihood of suc-
cess in neutralizing the competition).
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on Products B and C by monopoly pricing on Product A. Such a sce-
nario is economically no different than single product predation,
where the monopolist purportedly draws on its "deep pockets" to fi-
nance the costs of below-cost pricing while capital market imperfec-
tions prevent the victim firm from raising money to mount an effec-
tive response. The fact that the "deep pocket" in a case like LePage's
is the opportunity cost of not pricing Products B and C at their full
monopoly price, rather than the bank account or rich parent corpora-
tion of the ordinary predation story, is irrelevant. Money is fungible.
It should make little difference to the monopolist whether it finances
its predatory campaign through cash in a bank account or through
lowering prices on the monopoly products in a package discount. The
fact that package discounting could be seen as a form of cross-
subsidization of below-cost pricing in a competitive product market
does not make the story any more or less plausible than any other
predation story. In every predation story, the predator must have ac-
cess to capital to make short-run investments with the hopes of long-
37
run recoupment.
Although it is possible to recount a package discounting preda-
tion story, there is no reason to be generally suspicious of the practice.
Package discounting -commonly referred to as "mixed bundling" - is
a frequently observed phenomenon (think of "value" menu choices at
fast food restaurants, vacation packages, and package pricing on skiing
equipment). As the editors of a collection of articles on the market-
ing purposes of mixed bundling note, "[c]ollecting goods or services in
a package and selling them at a (discounted) package price has be-
come a widespread sales practice in many production or service ori-
ented industries."39 Surely not all firms offering such discounts are
predating. As David Evans and Michael Salinger observe, many of the
motivations for bundling and tying arrangements also explain the
36 See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F Brodley, and Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Stra-
tegic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Georgetown L J 2239,2285-90 (2000) (outlining and critiquing
developments in economic theory related to price predation); Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory
Pricing After Brooke Group:An Economic Perspective, 62 Antitrust L J 585,591 (1994) (suggest-
ing that economic theorists have swung back toward recognizing the ability of a predator firm
with deep pockets to drive competitors out of the market through predatory pricing).
37 See Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan, 88 Georgetown L J at 2291-92 (cited in note 36).
38 See Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics 408-12 (Prentice Hall
6th ed 2005) (analyzing the economics of mixed bundling and providing examples of bundling in
practice); Brief for Amici Curiae BellSouth Corp, et al, in Support of Petitioner, 3M Co v
LePage's Inc, No 02-1865, *1-4 (S Ct filed July 28, 2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL
22428381) (listing examples of and the reasons for engaging in bundling).
39 Ralph Fuerderer, Andreas Herrmann, and Georg Wuebker, Introduction to Price Bun-
dling, in Ralph Fuerderer, Andreas Herrmann, and Georg Wuebker, eds, Optimal Bundling:
Marketing Strategies for Improving Economic Performance 3 (Springer-Verlag 1999).
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presence of package discounts. '° Diversified firms may achieve econ-
omies of scope or scale,4' reduce transaction costs, 2 or stimulate de-
mand 3 by selling products in a package, and, as discussed above, pack-
age discounting may permit price discrimination." A firm might also
adopt package discounting as a strategy to defend or increase its mar-
ket share. It is this last possibility that the LePage's majority appeared
to view as interchangeable with predation-without good reason.
Undoubtedly, package discounting may permit a firm to exploit
its presence in multiple markets in order to obtain an advantage over
firms that compete in fewer than all of the markets covered by the
discount. The multiproduct firm may hope that single product com-
petitors will not drop their prices to match the entire multiproduct
discount, that customers will find it more convenient to purchase in a
package deal,5 that customers using separate "mental accounts" for
different products in the package portfolio will prefer the package
discount to an equal discount on the single product,46 or that, for many
40 David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from
Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 Yale J Reg (forthcoming 2005). See also
Michael A. Salinger, A GraphicalAnalysis of Bundling, 68 J Bus 85, 86 (1995) (positing a graphi-
cal analysis of bundling that allows for greater understanding of the profitability and welfare
consequences of the practice and shows that bundling can increase consumer surpluses).
41 See Thomas T. Nagle and Reed K. Holden, The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing: A Guide
to Profitable Decision Making 306-12 (Prentice Hall 3d ed 2002) (providing an overview of the
concepts of economy of scope and economy of scale and how they operate); Hermann Simon
and Georg Wuebker, Bundling-A Powerful Method to Better Exploit Profit Potential, in
Fuerderer, Herrmann, and Wuebker, eds, Optimal Bundling 7,13 (cited in note 39).
42 See Simon and Wuebker, Bundling at 13 (cited in note 41).
43 See Georg Wuebker, Vijay Mahajan, and Manjit S. Yadav, Buyers' Evaluation of Mixed
Bundling Strategies in Price-Promoted Markets, in Fuerderer, Herrmann, and Wuebker, eds,
Optimal Bundling 195, 195-205 (cited in note 39).
44 On bundling to price discriminate, see William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen, Com-
modity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q J Econ 475,476 (1976) ("[T]he profitability
of commodity bundling can stem from its ability to sort customers into groups with different
reservation price characteristics, and hence to extract consumer surplus."); George J. Stigler,
United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 S Ct Rev 152, 153 (demonstrating
how block-booking of movies can extract larger sums from customers than would otherwise be
possible).
45 See Stefan Stremersch and Gerard J. Tellis, Strategic Bundling of Products and Prices:
A New Synthesis for Marketing, 66 J Marketing 55, 70 (2002) ("[P]rice bundling of existing prod-
ucts ... decreases price sensitivity and increases individual consumers' purchase likelihood.").
46 On "mental accounts," see Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and
Anomalies of Economic Life 107-21 (Free Press 1992) (challenging the assumption that money
from various sources is characterized by the same marginal propensity to consume (MPC) and
arguing that people compartmentalize their life earnings into different "mental accounts," exhib-
iting a high MPC from current income and an almost zero MPC from future income). One can
imagine package discounting being a particularly effective strategy with respect to corporate
customers, where purchasing decisions are made by different managers controlling separate
budgets within a single firm. Since each manager would seek to optimize his or her own individ-
ual budget, the distribution of discounts across a range of product purchases might influence the
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other reasons, the package discount will be successful in increasing
sales. Notably, 3M increased its total sales and profits under its pack-
age discount program without LePage's being forced out of the mar-
ket." Unlike single product below-cost pricing, which is irrational in
the long run absent the exclusion of a competitor," long-run package
discounting may be a perfectly rational business strategy without re-
gard to any competitor's demise or the prospect of obtaining monop-
oly power and recouping.
In contrast to below-cost pricing, then, package discounting is not
conduct that makes sense only if a rival fails and exits the market. Is
that good or bad news for the practice? That depends on whom you
ask. Reverting momentarily to the "victim" perspective, the potential
permanence of package discounts seems to be a chief complaint of the
single product firm.4 9 Unlike single product below-cost prices, multi-
product discounting is not merely a storm to be weathered. It is a
market condition that could continue indefinitely, forcing the single
product firm either to maintain a long-run price near marginal cost on
its single product, or incur the costs to diversify and move into the
other product segments in the multiproduct firm's package. Either
strategy could be fatal. Pricing at less than total cost will eventually
put a firm out of business. Expanding into new areas may require
incurring significant sunk costs and, depending on the state of the de-
mand, operating at a less than efficient scale.'
But from a conventional antitrust perspective, the "permanence"
objection stands the theory of exclusionary conduct on its head. To
take the sacrifice theory of predation that the Department of Justice
has recently advanced in its major § 2 cases, conduct is not predatory
customer's collective purchasing decisions. The customer might not be willing to exchange a 10
percent discount on equally priced Products A, B, and C for a 30 percent discount on Product A
if that meant that the managers responsible for B and C would believe that their oxen were
being gored.
47 See LePage's, 324 F3d at 175-76 (Greenberg dissenting) ("[N]otwithstanding 3M's re-
bates, LePage's was able to retain most of the private-label [tape] business.").
48 Short-run, below-cost pricing for the promotion of new goods or services is common and
generally not thought to be predatory. See Areeda and Turner, 88 Harv L Rev at 713 (cited in
note 17).
49 Herbert Hovenkamp complains that 3M's discounts "were not only aggregated across
multiple products, but also over a lengthy time period" and that "[miulti-product discounts ag-
gregated over a prolonged period can in fact be used strategically with anticompetitive results."
Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles
and Their Application 749 at 182-83 (Aspen Supp 2004) (emphasis added).
50 See RM. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Harv L Rev
868,883-89 (1976) (discussing the long-term welfare implications of marginal cost pricing).
51 See U.S. Department of Justice, 1984 Merger Guidelines § 4.212, 49 Fed Reg 26823,
26835-36 (observing that a vertical merger may be anticompetitive if it will require competitors
to enter a second market at less than minimum efficient scale).
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unless its only rational explanation is the exclusion of competitors."
Pricing policies that could sensibly continue indefinitely, whatever the
ongoing viability of competitors, necessarily fail that definition. The
majority decision in LePage's condemns as anticompetitive price dis-
counting that would be perfectly lawful if given on a single product
and that could continue indefinitely as part of an ordinary business
strategy to increase market share and profits in a competitive market.
Suppose the sacrifice definition of predatory conduct is too nar-
row. Should we condemn above-cost multiproduct discounting on the
grounds that it is analogous to patent fraud, blowing up a competitor's
factory, or other tort-like conduct capable of excluding a competitor
that does not involve short-term sacrifice? 3 Surely not. Unlike inten-
tional torts that produce no obvious social welfare gains and cause
immediate harms at least to competitors (if not competition gener-
ally), above-cost package discounting brings immediate social gains by
driving prices toward marginal cost. Further, any risk of future harm is
remote. Conduct producing immediate and definite social gains and
only speculative long-term social losses under narrowly defined condi-
tions does not deserve its own "exclusionary conduct" subcategory.
LePage's has it backward. If anything, we should be more indul-
gent of package discounts than of single product discounts. Even sup-
posing that the reallocation of all discounts to the victim firm's prod-
uct market from other products made the effective price in the vic-
tim's market fall below marginal cost, that should not be sufficient
grounds for condemning the package discount as anticompetitive.
Such a pricing strategy might be adopted for legitimate business rea-
sons and, if effective competition exists for the other products, may
not even require the victim firm to absorb much more than some pro
rata percentage of the overall discount in order to remain price com-
petitive.' Pricing below cost through a unilateral price cut on a single
product is more likely to be exclusionary than effectively pricing be-
low cost on a single product subject to a package discount.
It is not my purpose here to propose a comprehensive legal rule
governing the legality of below-cost package discounts. For now, it is
enough to observe that if a bright line rule of per se legality for above-
52 See Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v British Airways PLC, 257 F3d 256, 269 (2d Cir 2001)
(citing 1997 Department of Justice guidelines on airline pricing for the proposition that "[a]
pricing strategy by a suspected predator harms consumers when the strategy is rational only if
the victim exits the market").
53 See Hovenkamp, 72 U Chi L Rev at 158 (cited in note 1) (discussing the problems with
applying "sacrifice" or recoupment tests to situations where the practices exclude immediately
and are likely to be profitable from the start).
54 See Part I.
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cost price cuts on single products is defensible, then a rule of per se
legality for package discounts that render above-cost effective prices
on all individual products in the package is even more so. At a mini-
mum, firms engaging in package discounting should be permitted to
claim as a safe harbor that the effective price in any single product
category-revenues from that product minus discounts on all other
products forgone as a result of rejecting the package discount-
exceeds the marginal cost of producing that product.5
From the "predator" perspective, package discounting need not
be predatory at all. Firms regularly employ mixed bundling strategies
for all sorts of reasons that antitrusters would rate from neutral to
procompetitive. If we decide to try to ferret out those infrequent occa-
sions when package discounts are employed for nefarious purposes,56
we should do so with great care. The Supreme Court has rightly wor-
ried that imprecision or error in the definition of pricing offenses
would chill vigorous price competition.7 Discounting in response to
competitive pressures is exactly the sort of behavior we hope antitrust
law will engender. The LePage's decision regrettably condemns as
anticompetitive above-cost discounting without offering any clear
guidance on when mixed bundling will be deemed illegal. That the
decision will have chilling effects on price discounting may be hard to
demonstrate, but corporate lawyers will surely find it hard to bless
package discounts without further clarity in the governing legal stan-
dards. And it is not hard to imagine that the threat of a treble damages
lawsuit under a standardless above-cost bundling theory could be used
55 There is precedent in federal courts for such a rule. See Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v
British Airways PLC, 69 F Supp 2d 571, 580 n 8 (SD NY 1999) (requiring a showing that "the
competitive product in the bundle [was] sold for a price below average variable cost after the
discounts on the monopoly items in the bundle were subtracted from the price of that competi-
tive product"), affd, 257 F3d 256 (2d Cir 2001).
56 I do not mean to suggest that an otherwise lawful pricing policy should be rendered
unlawful simply by evidence that its implementers hoped that it would drive a competitor out of
the market. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 214-15 (Chicago 2d ed 2001) (arguing against
intent-based doctrines of exclusionary conduct). Rather, any theory of predatory bundling
should be limited to those circumstances where the package discount makes no rational sense
absent the exclusion of a competitor and the ability to recoup by charging monopoly prices.
57 See Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398,
414 (2004) ("Mistaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations 'are especially costly,
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."'), quoting Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 594 (1986). See also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U Chi L Rev 263, 336 (1981) ("Con-
duct that might be predatory always involves lower prices, greater output, innovation, or other
features that usually increase consumers' welfare. Any attempt to administer a rule against pre-
dation entails a significant risk of condemning the outcome of hard competition.").
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by single product firms to deter vigorous price competition by diversi-
fied rivals.
We have now seen that the "victim's" best objection to package
discounts is their potential permanence, which should also be the
"predator's" best defense. It remains to ascertain the perspective of
the third party to the transaction-the party antitrust law exists to
protect" -the customer.
III. THE CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVE
Customers generally like price discounting, but prefer not to pay
lower short-run prices if this will drive some firm out of the market
and permit the remaining firm to institute long-run monopolistic
prices."O That much is obvious and uncontroversial. The consumer
preference question becomes stickier when the package discount pro-
gram remains in place for the long term and, although it does not nec-
essarily exclude any competitor, induces the customer to do business
with a single supplier. In this vein, Herbert Hovenkamp believes that
"the facts [of LePage's] are more readily likened to tying or exclusive
dealing than to predatory pricing."" Tying claims do not require the
same showing of short-term sacrifice, predatory triumph over a com-
petitor, and eventual supracompetitive pricing and recoupment as
does a conventional predatory pricing claim. It is enough that the
tying arrangement has "forced" the customer "to make a less than
optimal choice" in the tied product market.?
58 See Edward A. Snyder and Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Com-
petitor Plaintiff, 90 Mich L Rev 551, 597-98 (1991) (arguing for the abolition of private antitrust
actions by competitor plaintiffs); William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to
Subvert Competition, 28 J L & Econ 247, 263-65 (1985) (arguing for reform of private antitrust
actions so as to curb abuses).
59 See State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 15 (1997) (explaining that by protecting interbrand
competition, antitrust law aims to promote lower prices, which benefit consumers).
60 Although consumers as a class prefer not to accept predatory prices if they result in
long-term supracompetitive prices, this of course does not mean that predatory pricing schemes
will always be beaten back by farsighted consumers, since consumers face collective action prob-
lems in resisting predatory schemes. See, for example, John Vickers, Market Power and Ineffi-
ciency:A Contracts Perspective, 12 Oxford Rev Econ Policy 11, 24 (1996) (suggesting that, given
economies of scale, there is no inconsistency between the statements that consumers overall
would be better off if no consumer patronized a given company and that each individual con-
sumer is best off by patronizing that company).
61 Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 749 at 175 (cited in note 49).
62 See Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc v Clear Channel Communications, Inc, 311 F Supp
2d 1048, 1091-92 (D Colo 2004) (explaining that § 1 tying claims do not require a showing that
the defendant seeks to monopolize the tied market).
63 Fortner Enterprises, Inc v United States Steel Corp, 394 US 495, 512 (1969) (White dis-
senting). See also Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 12-15 (1984), on tying
as a form of "forcing" the consumer into an undesired choice.
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If they mind at all,' consumers dislike tying arrangements be-
cause such practices deprive them of some preferred choice and in-
crease their costs. For example, in International Salt Co, Inc v United
States," International Salt's customers might have preferred to pur-
chase their salt requirements from International Salt's competitors for
any number of business reasons, but were prohibited from doing so if
they wanted to lease International Salt's patented salt machines.6 But
any analogy between the compulsory contractual terms in Interna-
tional Salt or other bona fide tying cases and the multiproduct dis-
count in LePage's is weak. If customers chose to purchase within 3M's
discount package, it was only because the package discount offered
them a better price than they otherwise would have obtained.
It is not sensible to object that package discounting behaves, as a
practice, like tying because it forces customers to forgo their preferred
products for other, less desirable ones. Customer product preferences
assume a price point and, if the price point changes, so do the prefer-
ences. Suppose that Customer X would prefer Firm A's Product A to
Multi-Firm's Product A if both were priced at $10. If Multi-Firm
dropped its price from $10 to $8, Firm A stayed at $10, and Customer
X now purchased from Multi-Firm because the quality differential
between Multi-Firm's Product A and Firm A's Product A was worth
less than $2, we would not say that the price discount coerced Cus-
tomer X to forgo her true preference. We would say that Customer X
revealed her true preference.
One might try to say the same thing about ordinary contractual
tying, but the comparison does not work well. It is true that Interna-
tional Salt's customers revealed a preference for buying International
Salt's patented salt machines together with International Salt's salt
over whatever alternatives were available, but they might have pre-
ferred to buy the salt machines separately from the salt. That option
was not available at any price. But suppose that, instead of requiring
customers contractually to commit to purchasing its salt, International
Salt had offered a discount on its salt machine to any customer who
agreed to enter into a salt requirements purchase contract. Would any
customer be unhappy with such an offer in the sense that she would
64 See Posner, Antitrust Law at 200-02 (cited in note 56) (arguing that tying arrangements
are seldom harmful to consumers and are often beneficial).
65 332 US 392 (1947).
66 Id at 393. International Salt required customers who purchased its salt machines to
agree contractually to purchase their salt requirements from International Salt as well. Custom-
ers were permitted to purchase salt from competitors if the competitors offered the salt at a
lower price, but were required to give International Salt notice and an opportunity to match the
competitor's price. Id at 394 n 5. The federal government successfully challenged this practice as
a tying arrangement.
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prefer that International Salt offered no discount on its salt machines?
Clearly not-unless the long-term effect of the discount program was
that International Salt would deprive other salt sellers of a market,
obtain a monopoly over salt, and eventually increase the price of salt
to monopolistic levels. When it comes to package discounts, then, the
only sensible antitrust question is whether they threaten to drive out
equally efficient rivals and permit recoupment at supracompetitive
prices, not whether they act like tying arrangements in coercing
customers to abandon preferred choices.7 Whatever their juridically
proper legal category, package discounts should be tolerated, at least
in cases where they do not render prices effectively below cost in any
market covered by the package.
The tying analogy is not aided by the observation that customers
would prefer it if the multiproduct firm offered the same level of dis-
counts on each product in the package without making the discount
contingent on purchases in another product category. If the multipro-
duct firm adopts package discounting as a strategy to increase its mar-
ket share in a product category where it faces competition by giving
discounts in product categories where it has a monopoly,6 there is no
"but for" world in which the multiproduct firm lowers its price over the
monopoly products without getting some gain in the competitive cate-
gory. Monopolists do not lower their prices from the profit-maximizing
point without inducement. A rule prohibiting package discounts as "ty-
ing" will mean a return to higher prices in the monopoly categories
without any corresponding benefit in the competitive category.
The exclusive dealing analogy fares no better than the tying one.
Einer Elhauge argues that multiproduct loyalty rebating should be
treated as a nonprice offense because "by foreclosing the market
share rivals need to reach the minimum efficient scale, loyalty rebates
67 See Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, 9 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Anti-
trust Principles and Their Application I 1714e at 141-43 (Aspen 2d ed 2004) (identifying preda-
tion, not tying, as the proper primary concern for antitrust). I do not mean to deny that there is
statutory and case law authority treating package discounts as tying arrangements. See id I 1700i
at 9-10 (noting statutory support for the idea that a tie may be present without coercion and
claiming that a transaction "may be 'voluntary' in the sense that a buyer can obtain the first
product separately from a supplier and yet be a tie-in when the buyer's choice to purchase the
second product from that supplier is substantially influenced by the terms under which the two
products are sold together"). What I dispute is that there is any economically sound basis to
condemn an above-cost package discount as a "tie" under § 3 of the Clayton Act or § 1 of the
Sherman Act when the practice is not exclusionary of rivals or tending to create monopoly
power. If a package discount is not exclusionary of competition, it cannot be condemned on the
alternative grounds that it deprives customers of their independent choices, since package dis-
counts can only offer customers more choices than they otherwise would have had.
68 This discussion assumes that the multiproduct firm has a monopoly-or at least "market
power"-in the "tying" market, a prerequisite for a tying claim. Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 13-14.
This appears not to have been the case in LePage's, which further weakens the tying analogy.
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can raise rivals' costs or exclude them from the market altogether."69
But above-cost package discounts do not "foreclose" the single prod-
uct firm from competing for customers. If the single product firm can
match the diversified firm's effective price and remain above cost, it is
no more "foreclosed" than if a single product rival dropped its price to
the same above-cost level.
The exclusive dealing model of antitrust analysis does not do jus-
tice to above-cost package discounts. To be sure, the firm that offers
the lowest quality-adjusted price may "foreclose" competitors from
obtaining business from customers, and customers will naturally
choose to deal exclusively with the firm offering the lowest quality-
adjusted price. But that is true of any form of legitimate price compe-
tition-the firm offering the lowest price gets the business. Firms of
equal efficiency to the discounting firm can-and should, if they want
to stay in the market-drop their own prices in response to the discount
leader's price cuts. "Foreclosed" in the context of above-cost package
discounting is just a euphemism for "unwilling to price compete."
In contrast to tying and exclusive dealing arrangements, which
purportedly tend to restrict consumers' choices and increase their
costs, package discounts tend to enhance consumers' choices and de-
crease their costs. From the consumer perspective, then, package dis-
counts should not be unwelcome unless they are exclusionary of rivals
to the point of creating monopoly power in the discount offeror. This
just takes us back to the question of whether a package discount is any
worse from the "victim" perspective than a single product discount of
the same magnitude. For the reasons discussed in the previous two
Parts, the answer remains no.
If package discounts are neither coercive nor exclusionary of ri-
vals, then a legal rule discouraging their use will only make products
and services more expensive, much in the same way as a rule prohibit-
ing pricing below total cost would."' From the customer perspective,
the LePage's holding should rank along with Utah Pie Co v Continen-
tal Baking Co' and United States v Von's Grocery Co72 as a protection-
69 Elhauge, 112 Yale L J at 698 n 53 (cited in note 26).
70 See John E. Lopatka and William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer
Welfare, 69 Geo Wash L Rev 367, 407 (2001) ("[A]bove-cost price-cutting with no purpose other
than to drive out a competitor and reinforce monopoly power is per se lawful because its domi-
nant effect is to benefit consumers.").
71 386 US 685 (1967) (holding that a company may not sell similar goods to different cus-
tomers at different prices). See also Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court:
The Utah Pie Case, 77 Yale L J 70, 84-85 (1967) (labeling Utah Pie "the most anticompetitive
decision of the decade," which was "no mean achievement").
72 384 US 270 (1966) (holding that a proposed merger violated federal antitrust laws be-
cause it had a reasonable probability of lessening competition, both immediately and in the
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ist opinion with virtually no consumer benefits and substantial con-
sumer costs.
CONCLUSION
Package discounting is a common phenomenon among firms that
have no predatory ambition. It is a business strategy that often makes
perfectly good economic sense without any need for injury to a rival.
In the short run, it cannot harm competitors any more than an equiva-
lent price discount on a single product and, in the long run, it increases
consumer welfare by lowering the price of goods and services even if
no competitor exits the market. While a firm could conceivably em-
ploy package discounting as part of a predatory strategy, the condi-
tions under which such a strategy is likely to be successful are nar-
rower, not broader, than those necessary for single product predation.
LePage's thus errs in treating package discounting as less legally privi-
leged than single product price discounting.
As Richard Epstein hints in this Symposium, there are persuasive
reasons to abandon the entire enterprise of condemning prices as too
low." If one believes in conventional predatory pricing theory, package
discounting should be included as a narrower subset of the broader
theory. Above-cost effective prices in the competitive market (after
reallocation of discounts from the other markets) should be a safe
harbor for any multiproduct firm. Any other legal rule will discourage
discounting to the detriment of consumers.
The government's amicus brief recommending against certiorari
in LePage's advocates percolation of the package discounting issue
among the circuits while an economic consensus on the merits devel-
ops. " One can only hope that by the time the Supreme Court reaches
the issue, the consensus will not be that LePage's has cost consumers
billions of dollars in lost discounts.
future). See also Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 210 (Basic
1978) (naming Utah Pie and Von's Grocery as candidates for "the worst antitrust essay ever
written").
73 Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing Field? The New Antitrust
Paradox, 72 U Chi L Rev 49, 49 (2005) (criticizing the ways in which antitrust law condemns
unilateral practices without providing an explanation "as to why practices that are regarded as
efficient for ordinary firms are treated as illegal for dominant ones"). See also Easterbrook, 48 U
Chi L Rev at 336-37 (cited in note 57).
74 U.S. LePage's Amicus at *19 (cited in note 6).
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